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I. Introduction
{1} The new technology of digitization in our present "Information Age" has upset the delicate balance
created and maintained by copyright law between the rights of authors, users, and the industries that
collect the money. Which way the balance has tipped, what should be done about it, and how much
current copyright law needs altering, are questions that receive different answers depending on to whom
one talks. Some are afraid that authors will no longer be compensated for their creative efforts and will
consequently refuse to create.J2 Others worry that users will lose their right to read.3J Another concern
is the moral rights of authors in an environment where works can be transformed, and some might say
mutilated, with a few keystrokes. The only thing everyone seems to agree on is that our world is
changing due to technology and that current copyright law as it stands cannot keep up.
12) Amid all of this discussion of various people's rights; one distinction is often blurred. This is the
distinction between authors, the people who write and create the works, and the various industries that
get the works to the public: book publishers, the recording industry, film and television producers,
software companies, etc., refered to in this paper collectively as publishers. It is true that on occasion
these two functions are performed by the same person, as when a writer publishes with a vanity press, or
when a music group makes and sell its own recording. With more advanced technology, the merging of
functions becomes much easier and presumably more common. However, the reality is that in today's

corporate world, the publishing, and more importantly, the money-collecting functions, are most often
performed by large multi-national corporations, and these entities will probably continue to do so as we
move further into the Information Age. When one looks at who is making the arguments, and who has a
voice in defining the new copyright law, this domination by large multi-national corporations becomes
even more apparent.14
{3) One of the things that perpetuates the blurring of the distinction between authors and publishers is
the emphasis on economics. When economics is the issue, both are on the same side against users.
Authors and publishers want greater protection for intellectual property so they can collect more money
for the same product; users want less protection so they will have greater access to, and use of, the
products for less money. It is true that authors and publishers have their own disputes when it comes to
dividing up the money, but they are united against the user on this issue. Focusing on the moral rights of
authors brings out the distinction between authors and publishers. On this issue, authors often stand
alone against both users and publishers. Users may want to "borrow" an author's work or a part of it for
their own, use it as an example, or as an element in a larger work. Users may want to alter the work in
some way, put it in a setting that gives it a different meaning, or use it to make a point that may be
repugnant to the author. Publishers are often in a position in which they want to alter an author's work,
usually to make it more marketable to the public at large. A European source noted that authors and
publishers are on opposite sides of the moral rights issue with the representatives of authors and
performers advocating strong moral rights "while the representatives of publishers and the press,
producers, broadcasters and employers were hostile."[5_ Thus, there are really three distinct parties in
this discussion, each with different, sometimes competing, sometimes similar interests. In this
Information Age, the needs of all three parties must be considered in re-fashioning a balance of rights
between these three groups.
(4) In this paper, the balance between the rights of authors, publishers and users will be explored to see
how the technology affects their particular interests, and how various laws tip the balance of their rights
in different directions. This paper also includes an analysis of two recent proposals for adapting
copyright law to the new technology. One is a report released in September 1995 by the Working Group
on Intellectual Property Rights, a subcommittee of the Clinton Administration's Information
Infrastructure Task Force, titled "Intellectual Property and the National Information Infrastructure," but
more commonly referred to as the "White Paper."[_] The other is the "Green Paper on Copyright and
Related Rights in the Information Society," a report issued by the Commission of the European
Communities, a governing body of the European Union, in July 1995.2_] The scope of this paper
includes traditional works of authorship such as books, articles, ect. However, copyright law covers
many other forms of media including music, film, photography, sculpture, and computer software, and
with developments in technology, multi-media works combining many of these forms, as well as things
not yet imagined, will be included.J8j Insofar as copyright issues applying to these areas are similar to
those applied to text, the discussion will include them.
(5) However, this analysis will not address the many issues specific to certain mediums, such as music,
software, or databases. Of primary concern is the flow of information between creators and users.
Although the ease of information transfer on such programs such as the Internet has made copyright an
international issue, generating a great amount of concern over creating an international standard, the
focus will be on the laws of the United States regarding specific legal proposals, both to allow for more
specific suggestions, and because it is the legal framework within which this author was trained. Part II
of this paper examines the current balance of rights among authors, publishers, and users under U.S. law
and traditional technology. Part III looks at how the new technology affects the balance. Part IV
evaluates the proposals made by the White and Green Papers and examine their probable effect. Part V
explores what the balance should be. Part VI suggests what laws are needed to achieve this.

II. What The Balance Is Now
(6) First it may be helpful to examine the current balance between the rights of authors, users, and
publishers under the U.S. copyright statute[9] and conventional technology. This is not to claim that the
current balance as described in the succeeding pages is in any way ideal.[0_] However, it is a starting
place from which we can assess the effects of the new technology.
{7} The U.S. Copyright Act provides substantial economic rights to copyright holders -- initially
authors, and once sold or licensed, the various players in the publishing industry. Section 106 of the
Copyright Act lists the exclusive rights granted to copyright holders.[i] These rights include the right
to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords,[1!21 the right to prepare derivative works
based upon the copyrighted work,[_U3 the right to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted
work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending,[14] the right to
perform the copyrighted work publicly[5j and the right to display the copyrighted work publicly.LUhJ
In general, for those works created after January 1, 1978, these rights last for the life of the author plus
fifty years.[l 7] If the copyright owner's exclusive rights are infringed,[!.8] possible remedies include
injunction,[19] impounding and disposition of infringing articles,20] actual damages plus profits of the
infringer or statutory damages, 2 I]and costs and attorney's fees. [22] These remedies are available even
if there was no intent on the part of the infringer as copyright violation is strict liability.23] If the
infringement is willful and for the purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain, criminal
sanctions may be imposed.[241 This brief summary of several sections of the Copyright Act indicates
the strength of a copyright holder's economic rights.
(8) These fights are only limited by a few exceptions designed to give users some rights. As Jessica
Litman points out, there are very few provisions of the Copyright Act that address users' concerns. The
preferred legal interpretation is that copyright owners' rights are absolute, and users are not allowed to
invade them without permission unless their behavior falls within a statutory exception.[25j] The White
Paper states, "Users are not granted affirmative 'rights' under the Copyright Act; rather, copyright
owners' rights are limited by exempting certain uses from liability."[26] Whatever the language, these
exceptions are part of the law, and they do allow users to do certain things with copyrighted material
without an owner's permission, thus limiting owners' rights in favor of users.
(9) The first, and potentially broadest of these exceptions is the fair use exception. [2A7 It allows copying
without permission for "purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including
multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research."2.ZJ The statute lists four factors in
determining whether a use is fair. They are:
1. the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is
for nonprofit educational purposes;
2. the nature of the copyrighted work;
3. the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole;
and
4. the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.[29].
{10) In both the statutory language and the courts' interpretation of it, the emphasis on the economic
rights of copyright owners is clear. The first factor explicitly mentions the commercial nature of the use,
and in Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios. Inc.,3_] the Supreme Court declared that all commercial
uses are to be presumed unfair."[31] The fourth factor which directly addresses the economic impact of
the copying is often considered to be the most significant of the four. [32_ In two cases involving
copying and the new technology, namely, the posting of copyrighted material on bulletin board services

on the Internet, the court in each case placed great weight on the economic impact of the copying to find
the use infringing. In Playboy EnterprisesInc. v. Frena, the court said the issue was whether widespread
incidents of conduct like the defendant's "would result in a substantially adverse impact of the potential
market for or value of [Playboy's copyrighted photographs]. ". 3 In Sega EnterprisesLtd. v. MAPHIA,
the court found that the fourth factor weighed "heavily" against a finding of fair use, stating, "should the
unauthorized copying of Sega's video games by Defendants and others become widespread, there would
be a substantial and immeasurable adverse effect on the market for Sega's copyrighted video game
programs."[M4] This illustrates that currently, the balance between authors, users, and industry is framed
in economic terms, with significant priority given to copyright holders' economic rights.
{11} The second most important "user right" mentioned in the Copyright Act is the exception known as
the first sale doctrine.J35] Under this doctrine, once a person has lawfully obtained a copy of a
copyrighted work, she may dispose of possession of it in any way she likes without the copyright
owner's permission. This allows people to lend books to their friends, give them as gifts, sell them to a
used book store, etc. It is crucial for libraries, because it allows them to loan the same book to hundreds
of people free of charge because they themselves are not charged. This doctrine greatly facilitates the
spread of information and is very important to users, especially low and middle income users.
{12) There are further exceptions to copyright holders' exclusive rights for use by libraries and for
educational uses. The library exemption allows libraries to make a single copy of a work for specified
purposes including archival copies, replacement copies, articles and short excerpts for users, out-of-print
works for scholarly purposes, news programs, and interlibrary loan. [ 6] This exemption makes it easier
for libraries to do their work and is aimed at a very select group of users, although we all benefit from
the availability of libraries. The educational use exemptions allow educators to "perform or display"
copyrighted works in connection with teaching activities by a non-profit educational institution. [ _1
Other performances and displays are also exempt under this section, including those used in religious
services, at non-profit veterans' organizations, and transmissions to disabled persons, all subject to
The Copyright Act also provides for compulsory licenses to
various restrictions and limitations.3[
cable companies and satellite transmitters.[391 Although numerous, these various specialized
exemptions are very narrow and only apply to a limited number of people. From this brief summary,
although not expressed in the language of rights, users do get some consideration in the current balance
between authors, users and publishers.
{13) One area that generates little concern under U.S. law is the moral rights of authors. It was only in
1990 that the Copyright Act for the first time explicitly recognized any moral rights of authors.J40 This
came in the form of the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 (VARA),[41] which gives artists certain moral
rights in a visual work of art. It should be noted that the Act is very limited, because a visual work of art
is defined as a "painting, drawing, print, or sculpture existing in a single copy, in a limited edition of 200
copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively numbered by the author," or a photograph produced
for exhibition purposes only, and similarly limited in quantity._42]
(14) There are a few other sections of the Copyright Act that could be construed to provide some
protection for moral rights of authors, although this was not their primary intent. The broadest of these is
section 106(2); the exclusive right to prepare derivative works.[43] Since the alteration of an author's
work in such a way that it violates the author's right of integrity can probably be seen as the creation of a
derivative work, possession of an exclusive right to prepare derivative works allows the author to
prevent offensive derivative works from being created. Another is section 11 5(a)(2), a compulsory
license section that grants the privilege of making a musical arrangement of a copyrighted musical work
under certain conditions. It has a clause stating, "the arrangement shall not change the basic melody or
fundamental character of the work."j4[1 Although this is an explicit nod to moral rights, like VARA, its
application is very limited. These are the two sections cited by the Final Report of the Ad Hoc Working

Group on U.S. Adherence to the Berne Convention.[45] There are a few other sections that have been
mentioned in the literature as possibly protecting moral rights, but any contribution they make is
negligible.[46j]
{15} The section of the federal trademark statute, the Lanham Act, that forbids false designations of
origins of goods and false descriptions or representation of goods is also a possible source of protection
for authors moral rights.[47] It was used for this purpose in Gilliam v. American BroadcastingCo., in
which the Second Circuit found that the airing of a drastically cut version of Monty Python shows
violated the integrity of the work. [48] Other provisions of U.S. law cited as protecting authors' moral
rights include the implied covenants of fair dealing and good faith in contract law, the tort theories of
unfair competition, defamation, and the rights of privacy and publicity.[49 However, this is not the
conventional use of each of these theories. To prevail, one probably needs a sympathetic court.
{16} On the international scene, protection of authors' moral rights comes in the form of Article 6bis of
the Berne Convention, which protects the moral rights of paternity (attribution) and integrity. It states:
(1) Independently of the author's economic rights, and even after the transfer of the said
rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work and to object to any
distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the
said work, which would be prejudicial to his honour or reputation.[Q
The United States became a party to this treaty in 1989. However, not everyone agrees that the U.S. is in
full compliance with Article 6bis. This section is one of the main reasons for the U.S. delay in joining
the Berne Convention. When the U.S. finally did join, it was under the theory that the U.S. Copyright
Act should be amended as little as possible.[51] Much effort was made to show that we were already in
compliance with Article 6bis, so no further changes were needed. The Final Report of the Ad Hoc
Working Group on U.S. Adherence to the Berne Convention concluded:
Given the substantial protection now available for the real equivalent of moral rights under
statutory and common law in the U.S., the lack of uniformity in protection of other Berne
nations, the absence of moral rights provisions in some of their copyright laws, and the
reservation of control over remedies to each Berne country, the protection of moral rights in
the United States is compatible with the Berne Convention.[5]
Although we may be technically in compliance with Article 6bis, this statement illustrates the lack of
commitment to moral rights in the United States.
{17} One of the reasons this has not been a critical problem is that traditional technology provides a
great deal of built-in protection for authors' moral rights. With the current technology, it is very difficult
for an ordinary user, a member of the public, to violate an author's moral rights on a widespread basis.
To violate an author's right of paternity in a book by disguising its true author with any degree of
credibility, or to alter the text in any way by adding or deleting words or sentences, thus violating an
author's right of integrity, one would have to reprint the book. Crossing out an author's name with a
crayon is not going to be very convincing, and one can only do this to a few copies, so the damage will
be very limited. The same applies to a video or cassette. The expense, time, and effort required to alter a
work with traditional technology discourages most would be violators. Even if the violators are willing
to go to the trouble, it is still difficult to disseminate the mutilated work to the public at large. This
makes the initial effort of mutilation even less attractive, and prevents most mutilated works from
reaching very many people. The only type of work to which this analysis does not apply is single or
limited editions of works of visual art; presumably this is why Congress felt it necessary to enact

VARA, but nothing that applied to mass produced or literary works. Given the difficulty to the average
user of first mutilating, and then distributing, an author's work with traditional technology, the risk of it
occurring is very small.
{18} Currently, the greatest danger to authors' moral rights comes from the publishing industry. This is
the level at which it is easiest, and therefore most likely, to alter an author's work. However, since the
author deals directly with her prospective publisher, she may retain some control over her work through
a contract. It is true that usually the publisher has the greater bargaining power and the author will
probably have to take whatever is dictated to her. This also occurs when an author's moral rights are
protected by statute. Most statutes provide that an author can waive her moral rights,[_3] putting the
issue back into the realm of individual contracts. This is supported by the Green Paper's observation that
even in countries that recognize moral rights, they are rarely invoked to prevent the exploitation of a
work. It claimed:
The reason was that in areas where the point was a sensitive one the parties came to an
arrangement which avoided such situations. In other areas, such as the cinema, the principal
director had to reach agreement with the producer before the film was made, which avoided
most of the problems that might otherwise have arisen at a later stage.,[54]
This indicates that there were no moral rights' problems between authors and individual users,5] which
supports the theory that the traditional technology made conflicts very unlikely.
III. How The New Technology Will Affect The Balance
{19} There is no doubt that the technology of digitization will have a profound effect on copyright law.
John Perry Barlow claims that, as a result of this new technology, "[e]verything we think we know about
intellectual property is wrong."[5_6_] Whether or not he is right about this, everyone does agree that
digitization has shifted the balance of power among authors, users, and the publishing industry.
{20} Digitization allows copying to be done quickly, cheaply, and easily, with no loss in quality, and
then distributed to (potentially) millions of people in a few seconds. Because of the new Information
Superhighway, it can be done in the comfort of one's own home with just a personal computer and a
modem. This gives users a tremendous advantage over the other parties by increasing the amount of
information available while decreasing the cost. This has copyright holders worried, because they do not
know how to harness the value of this information. When information is no longer tied to a tangible
good that can be transferred from one person to another (like a book, magazine, cassette, or video), it
becomes much more difficult to control its flow. As Barlow explains, with traditional technology, "the
value was in the conveyance and not in the thought conveyed," or more metaphorically, "the bottle was
protected, not the wine."[57] Copyright holders have always been worried about new copying
technology. Photocopy machines, cassette recorders, and video recorders have all been thought to be a
threat to copyright. [58] However, these methods of copying take time, cost money (minimally the raw
materials: paper, blank cassettes and videos), and usually the quality of the copy is at least somewhat
inferior to the original. With digitization, none of these disincentives to copy exists, which makes
copyright holders afraid that users will decide to "steal" the information rather than pay for it. This
creates a serious problem for those in the business of collecting money for copyrighted materials,
namely the publishing industry. This problem eventually will be passed on to the authors, who will still
wish to be paid for their work. So the user appears to win out on this one.
{21} Another aspect of digitization that benefits the user over the copyright holder is the ease with which
works may be altered. Digitization allows a user to easily remove an author's name from a work,

substituting his own name, another's, or none at all. It allows a user to alter text, insert words, delete
paragraphs, etc. Other mediums, such as pictures, music and motion pictures can also be modified. This
makes it much easier for users to create their "own" works, using other people's creations as a jumping
off point. It is debatable whether these new works are truly creative or valuable, but there are many who
would argue that they are. However, they are also very likely to violate both the copyright holder's right
to prepare derivative works and the author's moral right of integrity. The potential for harm to an
author's moral rights with this new technology is tremendous. [59] No longer will technical difficulties
discourage people from appropriating and "improving," or even destroying another person's work. Once
the changes have been made, the mutilated work can be sent out to millions of people with a few key
strokes, "published" for the world to see.
{22) The Green Paper concurs in this assessment, claiming "that at the present time [with traditional
technology] moral rights did not pose any real problems as far as the Internal Market was concerned,"
but:
With the arrival of the information society the question of moral rights is becoming more
urgent than it was. Digital technology is making it easier to modify works. The Commission
believes there is a need for an examination of the question whether the present lack of
harmonization will continue to be acceptable in the new digital environment.60]
(23) The group that is most hurt by this aspect of the new technology is authors. The publishing industry
is harmed in a limited way, since there is some economic benefit to the right to prepare derivative works,
and an author's reputation is of some concern to his publisher. However, the real danger is to the authors
themselves, a group that is very poorly represented in most copyright debates when it comes to moral
rights. In any situation, any group opposed to the publishers on a given issue will be poorly represented
because they are poorly funded.
{24} Not all aspects of the new technology favor users. While information becomes cheaper and more
readily available, it also becomes easier to track, posing a serious threat to users' privacy. The Green
Paper sees digitization as an opportunity to tighten things up through monitoring. It states:
The development and spread of analogue systems of reproduction had made it impossible to
control copying, and especially private copying, but the digitization of works and other
protected matter means that strict control of reproduction can now be envisaged once again.
[61
{25) The theory is that with the advent of photocopy machines, cassette and video recorders, private
copying[62] became practical, widespread, and untraceable, causing a certain amount of leakage in the
copyright system. Because there is no way to determine who is doing the copying on a self-serve
photocopy machine or a private video recorder, there is no way to stop people from doing it.[63] This
leakage was something the publishing industry had to live with.[6_] With digitization, this problem may
be eliminated. With the appropriate technology, one can determine every time a copy of a work is made
and who made it. The Green Paper suggests this information could be linked to the system used for
This would ensure that nothing slipped
charging for network access to facilitate revenue collection.[
through. The White Paper suggests that this technology in combination with licensing could lead to
"reduced application and scope of the fair use doctrine."[66] Not only would this shift the economic
balance back to the copyright holders, and more specifically, the publishing industry, it would be a
tremendous invasion of user privacy, reminiscent of George Orwell's 1984. The money-collectors would
know what every user was reading and for how long. The potential for the new technology of
digitization is very great, but which groups it favors is not yet clear. This will be determined to a large
extent by copyright law.

IV. Two Proposals To Amend The Copyright Laws and How They Will Affect The
Balance: The White and Green Papers
{26) The original intent of this article was to contrast the recommendations of the White Paper with
those of the Green Paper. However, after having studied both documents leads to the conclusion that the
difference between the two lies in their form of presentation (the White Paper makes concrete
recommendations, the Green Paper merely raises issues6[7 ), and the motives behind the
recommendations (the White Paper seems driven by a hope to use intellectual property to ameliorate the
U.S. trade deficit, while the Green Paper is concerned with the free movement of goods and services
within the European Union). The recommendations are, however, essentially and depressingly, the
same.
427) The first thing to note is that both the White and Green Papers are economically motivated, so their
bias is for the publishing industry. The White Paper is concerned with realizing the "full potential" of the
Interet.[681 This can be translated as "economic potential." Although it does not say so explicitly, it is
hinted at in the following declaration, "unless the framework for legitimate commerce is preserved and
adequate protection for copyrighted works is ensured, the vast communications network will not reach
itr -ill potential."[69] It has been suggested that the government's recent interest in copyright law stems
fr -i concern over the national trade deficit. Since we are moving from a manufacturing economy to an
iniormation based economy, the government has become interested in harnessing the economic value of
information. This is a strong motivation behind the White Paper.
(28) The European Green Paper is also economically oriented, as might be expected from a report
issued by an organization devoted to removing barriers to the free flow of commerce within the
European Community.[70] The Green Paper's focus is on the extent of the need for harmonization in
copyright law among member nations. The main concern appears to provide a uniform level of
intellectual property protection, so those seeking to reap the value of their intellectual property will not
be afraid to allow that property to go beyond their national borders. The Green Paper states, "Those
seeking to operate in the new environment must not find themselves hemmed in by legal constraints
arising from a fragmented market."L.7I] Apparently, "harmonization" is needed when there is a threat to
the publishing industry's ability to collect its money.
429) The most controversial aspect of the White Paper centers around its recommendation that the
transmission of copies and phonorecords should fall within the exclusive distribution right of the
copyright holder.[72] This is strongly criticized by Litman because she claims that it will give the
copyright holder the exclusive right to control reading, since merely receiving and viewing a
copyrighted work on a computer screen without permission would constitute a violation.[73Z The White
Paper claims that its recommendation is really just a clarification of the law, needed because
traditionally, when one distributes a copy of a work, the distributor no longer retains possession,
whereas when a work is transmitted by computer, a copy is retained in the transmitter's file. The
assumption is that transmitting a digitized work is the modem equivalent of distributing it. Copyright
law simply needs to be brought up to date.
{30) The White Paper further asserts that because the reproduction right is also implicated in every
transmission, copyright holders' rights are not really being expanded. It is here, with its interpretation of
the exclusive right of reproduction, where the real problem lies. According to the White Paper, "the
placement of copyrighted material into a computer's memory is a reproduction of that material." [741 Yet
this occurs almost every time one uses the Internet because every time something is viewed on a
computer screen it is placed in the computer's Random-Access Memory (RAM), even if only for a very
short period of time.[7L5 Unfortunately, this interpretation is not an imaginary invention of the White

Paper. One court has already held that the uploading of a copyrighted work onto an Internet bulletin
board service is the creation of a reproduction,[-6] and Litman cites three cases that claim that a work is
reproduced every time it is read into a computer's RAM.[Z.] The White Paper acknowledges that under
this interpretation, the exclusive reproduction right "will be implicated in most NIl (Internet)
transactions,"[7] yet it expresses no concern over this broad reach of the copyright holder's power.
131) The White Paper's claim that copyright holders' rights are not expanded at the expense of users
under this interpretation is disingenuous, for the very reason that it felt it was necessary to "clarify" the
distribution right, namely, that when one transmits a work on the Internet, one retains a copy in one's
own computer. Since one does not dispose of one's own copy, the first sale doctrine will not apply on the
Internet.L9] No longer will one be able to share a book with a friend on the Internet, because when one
loans the book to a friend, one keeps the original, thus infringing both the reproduction and distribution
rights of the copyright holder. The same problem will apply to libraries.[8_] One of the main sources of
user rights will disappear. If we eventually reach the day when books are available only on the Internet
and there is a charge for each viewing, the poor user will no longer have access to reading material.
{32) The Green Paper is a little behind the White Paper in its interpretation of the law, if not in its vision
for copyright control. It devotes an entire section to arguing that "the digitization of works or other
protected matter should generally fall under the reproduction right, as should such things as loading on
to the central memory of a computer," [8L] expressing the hope that copyright holders will then be able
to "catch" every instance of private reproduction with a little universally implemented technology. Like
the White Paper, the Green Paper wishes to eliminate a user exception to copyright holders rights, the
exemption allowed by some European countries for private copying. The Green Paper explains that
harmonization is necessary in this area so copyright holders in countries that do not allow private
copying will not refuse to allow their works to be exported to countries that do.
133) The White Paper has two more recommendations that seriously infringe on users' rights. The first is
pending legislation to which the White Paper merely lends its support. This is a bill that would change
the criminal offense standard from that of willful infringement for purposes of financial gain to willful
infringement by reproducing or distributing copies with a retail value of $5,000 or more.__2_ This bill
was proposed in direct response to the case, United States v. LaMacchia, in which an MIT student
published copyrighted software on Internet bulletin boards for users to download without charge. [831
Because LaMacchia was motivated by personal beliefs rather than financial gain, he could not be
convicted under the current law.
(34) Another White Paper recommendation that at first glance appears to be a viable solution to serious
copyright violations also infringes on user rights. The proposal is to add a new chapter to the Copyright
Act that would include the following provision:
[T]o prohibit the importation, manufacture or distribution of any device,...the primary
purpose or effect of which is to avoid, bypass, remove, deactivate, or otherwise circumvent,
without authority of the copyright owner or the law, any [encryption or copy-protection
mechanisms].iI8_ 4
This proposal is akin to outlawing the sale of bicycle front wheels because it aids people who steal
bicycles by leaving the front wheel still locked to the rack. The problem is that there are many legitimate
reasons for copying a copyrighted work, not the least of which is fair use. The White Paper makes a big
deal of the fact that the fair use exemption will still apply on the Internet to illustrate that users' rights
are not being reduced, yet it shows no concern for ensuring that users can take advantage of the Fair Use
Exemption.

(35) Another White Paper recommendation that increases one group of copyright holders' rights has
been signed into law. There is now a limited public performance right for sound recordings that applies
to sound recordings performed by means of subscription service digital transmissions. [85] This is less
than the White Paper had hoped for; it recommended afull public performance right._86
{361 The White Paper does make two recommendations in favor of user rights over copyright holder
rights. One is that the library exemptions be amended to allow libraries to make three copies of works in
digital form for archival and preservation purposes. Under current law, the library copying exemptions
do not permit digital reproduction.[7] The White Paper has a great deal to say about the importance of
libraries to support this recommendation, but it completely ignores the implications of its interpretation
of the reproduction right and first sale doctrine on the role of libraries discussed above. Provision to
make three digital copies hardly makes up for being shut out of the Internet! The other recommendation
is an exemption for reproduction for the visually impaired.[8_] This is certainly to the White Paper's
credit, but like most Copyright Act exemptions, it is very limited and will have little effect on the public.
{37) The only White Paper recommendation that may seriously affect the balance of rights in a positive
direction is an amendment prohibiting the falsification, alteration or removal of copyright management
information.J89] This sounds dangerous, but as defined by the White Paper, copyright management
information only consists in the name of the author, the name of the copyright owner, and the terms and
conditions for uses of the work. It does not detect every time a copy is made. The White Paper describes
it as a "license plate for a work on the information superhighway;"[90] it is not a homing device.
Alth; Igh primarily intended to facilitate the economic concerns of copyright, this would be a strong
step in protecting the moral rights of authors without infringing on users legitimate rights. Prohibiting
falsification or removal of an author's name from his work directly protects his right of paternity.
{38) As might be expected, the White Paper says very little about moral rights explicitly. The issue
receives less than two pages in a 238 page document, and they merely explain that U.S. Copyright law
complies with Article 6bis of the Berne Convention. 91J] The Green Paper does much better in this area,
at least in the attention moral rights is given. It is one of the nine subjects[9_2 regarding copyright law
that has its own section, which includes an introduction explaining how new technology is affecting
moral rights, the present legal context in international and community law, an assessment of the
questions from the Community viewpoint and questions to which interested parties are invited to reply.
[93 Moral rights receives its own section because a previous Green Paper was criticized for not
addressing the issue.[94] Thus "moral rights were among the points needing study which were listed in
the Commission's work programme for 1991," and a two-day hearing on the issue was held at the end of
1992.L95 Unfortunately, the discussion is limited to examining the alternatives without suggesting any
concrete solutions for protecting authors' moral rights under the new technology. The focus is on
avenues other than copyright law.
(391 These alternatives are explored in the form of questions. The first question regards the need for
harmonization in moral rights laws among Member nations. Although this seems like an issue limited to
the European Union, it is a concern for U.S. authors on an international level. Because the Internet is
international and transmission of digitized information is not limited by national boundaries, it is
particularly important to protect moral rights throughout the world. However, since the U.S. is notably
backward on the moral rights issue, we should attempt to take care of things at home first.
(40) The Green Paper asks whether moral rights might be resolved by contract, suggesting, "[w]hen
material is placed on the network, for example, or even when it is digitized, the author might agree to
certain types of modification such as dubbing, subtitling, reformatting etc."19_j According to the Green
Paper, this is how moral rights issues are resolved currently.[9_7 The Green Paper does not address the
problem of digitization, that now users, as well as publishers, are capable of mutilating works and then

distributing them on a large scale. Contracts are between a few parties, usually two, not an author and
millions of people he has not met.
{411 The Green Paper suggests that the very fact that the author has agreed to digitization could be taken
to give rise to a presumption that he has agreed to certain modifications.98] This is already asking
authors to give up a lot, perhaps too much, and it does not address the fact that analogue works such as
printed text can be scanned into a computer or typed in and thus digitized without the author's
knowledge or consent.
(42) A further possibility posed by the Green Paper is that the acceptability of modifications could be
defined in collective agreements between authors and performers on the one hand, and producers and
publishers on the other. [99 This suggestion combines both problems of the previous two proposals.
First, it leaves out users, the real threat to authors' moral rights. Second, it does not deal with authors not
subject to the agreements (because they chose not to digitize their work) might still find their work in
danger on the Internet.
(43) The Green Paper's final question asks whether "solutions should be negotiated globally or sector by
sector (cinema, newspaper publishing, libraries, museums, etc.)?"[LOO] The advantage to making laws
that apply globally is that all authors will be protected, not just those in selected industries. Furthermore,
with the increasing ability to create multi-media works, the various industries are becoming less distinct.
However, given the delicate balance between authors' moral rights and users' free speech interests.
Therefore, it might be wiser to legislate sector by sector, to accommodate everyone's needs in different
areas. The Green Paper's contribution to moral rights in a digitized environment is important because by
exploring the issue it creates discussion, even if it does not provide any satisfactory solutions.

V. What The Balance Should Be
(44) Having criticized the suggestions of others, it is now time to decide just what should be the balance
between authors, users, and publishers. Copyright is not a natural right. It is a right created by law.
Because the new technology affects the balance to such a great extent, in ways never anticipated by the
drafters of the Copyright Act, we cannot not use the Copyright Act, particularly its specific language, as
the starting point of our analysis. Litman argues that even if the language of the Copyright Act implies
that a transmission from one computer to another implicates the reproduction and distribution rights, we
should abandon this interpretation on the grounds that "it is hard to make a plausible argument that
Congress would have enacted a law giving copyright owners control of reading." 1L]
(45) We could, like Descartes in his project to ascertain what knowledge he could be certain of, doubt
all copyright law. Unlike Descartes, however, we need not search for an elusive indubitable first
principle. In U.S. law we have one--the Constitution. It provides the parameters within which we must
work to find the ideal balance between authors, users, and publishers. This is where our inquiry should
begin.L02] The Copyright Clause says Congress has the power "[t]o promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective writings and Discoveries."l[13]
(46) Many have interpreted this to mean that authors and inventors must be compensated for their
creative efforts or else they will refuse to create, and science and the useful arts will languish. This
certainly is the position of the White Paper, which claims:
Protection of works of authorship provides the stimulus for creativity, thus leading to the
availability of works of literature, culture, art and entertainment .... If these works are not

protected, then the marketplace will not support their creation.[1_04]
According to the White Paper, if we do not protect intellectual property interests on the Internet, authors
will not contribute to the Internet and it will have no content.
{47) The first thing to point out is that there is no proof for this theory. Litman challenges it with two
very compelling counter examples, fashion design and recipes, neither of which are protected as
intellectual property, yet we do not lack for creative efforts in either area.[105] The one flaw with these
counter examples is that in both cases, the creativity is intermingled with a tangible product which in of
itself can be sold to generate value. This is not true of intellectual property on the Internet. There are
other counter examples from history that are more directly on point. Some of our greatest literature was
written by proverbial starving artists who were not financially compensated for their work. Well-known
examples include Percy Shelley, Edgar Allen Poe, Herman Melville, Fyodor Dostoevsky and Franz
Kafka, to name but a few. Lack of financial reward did not cause these masters to be stingy with their
talent or abandon it for some more lucrative pursuit.
{48) The second thing to note about the Copyright Clause is that its primary purpose is to promote the
progress of science and useful arts. It is intended to benefit society as a whole and improve our culture.
It was not meant to protect our gross national product. The Supreme Court states "[t]he immediate effect
of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an 'author's' creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by
this incentive, to stimulate artistic activity for the general public good."f 106]. If we step back from the
economic frenzy that seems to drive our government and consider the Copyright Clause in conjunction
with the protection of individual dignity and freedom that underlies our Constitution, it becomes clear
that our goals should be quality creative works, access to those works by the general public, and privacy
and dignity for all individuals.
VI. What Laws Do We Need To Achieve This Balance
{49} With these goals in mind, we must now determine how to write the laws to create the appropriate
balance of author, user, and publisher rights. I do not wish to propose any model legislation. My
suggestions will be general, an outgrowth of the analysis in this paper, with a recommendation that we
proceed cautiously. If our goals are to facilitate the spread of quality information and protect the dignity
of all individuals, the real problem becomes how to ensure freedom for the user while simultaneously
time guaranteeing dignity for the author. If one forgets about the author, or simply lumps her into the
category of "copyright holder," thus merging her interests with those of the various publishing
industries, it is very easy to champion the user over greedy corporate interests. Current interpretation of
the Copyright Act in light of new technology and the White Paper's recommendations are much too proowner; the user's rights are almost swallowed up. Furthermore, corporations are quite capable of taking
care of themselves in the legal arena. However, the author is not so well-protected, especially in the
United States, where moral rights are seen as something to pay lip service to so the rest of the world
does not look down on us. The problem is that to a large extent authors' rights are opposed to those of
users. Authors want to be paid for their work, users want it for free; authors insist their work remain
exactly as they created it, users want to use it however they please. One could invoke the White Paper's
logic here to claim that it really is in the interests of users to have strong intellectual property rights and
careful monitoring to insure that these rights are not infringed upon, because without guaranteed
protection, authors will not create. However, as I have already noted, this argument is not convincing.
So the question is how to reconcile the problem.
{50} Since moral rights are the most threatened by the new technology, and the least protected by our
laws, this is a good place to start. The White Paper's recommendation of a law that would prohibit the

falsification, alteration, or removal of copyright management information which includes the name of
the author is a good start. This would protect an author's right of paternity. We also need a law that
would prohibit the alteration and subsequent dissemination of the content of an author's work. Some
may argue that this would stifle creativity and abridge free speech rights. Clearly a balance is needed in
this area. The minimum protection an author should receive is to require notification on a work stating
that it has been altered, and indicating where the original can be accessed. This would at least prevent
dissemination of false information, which would go a long way to protecting an author's honor and
reputation. It is possible that anything further would be an abridgment of free speech rights, because a
requirement that an author's work not be altered in any way that would harm his honor or reputation
might prevent legitimate criticism. The standards of defamation law would not help in this area because
the alteration of a work is not true or false.[L07] The maximum protection an author's right of integrity
could receive would have to allow for fair use, parody, political and social expression, and legitimate
criticism.
{51} A major criticism of laws regulating private behavior in a digitized environment centers around
enforcement. It is believed that the laws cannot be enforced without strict monitoring that would violate
the privacy rights of users. However, this is less of a problem with moral rights laws. This is because
something that violates a moral rights law can be proven from the work itself. One simply has to
compare the accused work with the original. The problem with enforcing economic rights is that one
cannot tell if a copy is lawful or infringing unless one determines how the person obtained it. There are
still many-problems with enforcement of moral rights laws. If a user altered both the name of the author
and the content of the work, it might be impossible to prove that the new work had any connection with
the original beyond coincidental similarity. However, this type of major alteration would not harm an
author as much as attributing something to him that he did not create. There is also the problem of
determining responsibility. Just because an altered version of an author's work shows up in a computer
somewhere does not mean that the owner'of the computer did the altering. They may have received it in
that form from someone else. The benefit of a moral rights law is that the author would have some form
of recourse in egregious cases. If the altered work were widely distributed, or simply posted on a
bulletin board, the author would be able to suppress it by getting an injunction to have it removed. An
injunction might have the effect of making possession of the altered work illegal after a sufficient
notification period. The author should also have the remedy of posting notice of the violation and
perhaps a copy of the original, if desired, free of charge, similar to a retraction in a defamation case,
based on the theory that the remedy for bad speech is more speech.
{52} Although moral rights laws cannot be strictly enforced, they may go a long way to protecting those
rights without actual prosecution. Most people do not want to break the law. If the benefit for doing so is
not great, many people will not do it even if there is no chance of getting caught. There is much less
incentive to mutilate another person's work than there is to copy it for free, especially if the cost of
obtaining a lawful copy is too great. Also, people may have more respect for moral rights than economic
ones. It is easier to understand why one should not mutilate another person's work or appropriate it for
oneself than why one must pay for something that one believes should be free to begin with. Moral
rights have a moral component. To put one's name on another person's work is plagiarism, we are
already taught that this is theft. Attributing a work to someone who did not create it or changing the
content of what she wrote involves the conveying of false information, otherwise known as lying. Even
if a person has no hesitation about copying something for her own use or merely reading something on
her computer screen, she may have some scruples about breaking the law when it also harms the dignity
of another human being. The mere existence of laws upholding moral rights will help to teach people the
implication of playing with someone else's work.[1108] Since the new technology makes it so easy for
users to become authors themselves, they will be more likely to respect the rights of others. By enacting
such laws, we could protect the dignity of authors without invading the privacy of users.

453) There are still those who will insist that some form of monitoring is necessary to enforce the laws
to protect copyright holders' economic rights.,[09] Given the enormous invasion of privacy this would
entail, I disagree.[ 100] Economic rights will take care of themselves. They are already well protected
under our current scheme, and even if digitization provides more incentive for unauthorized copying
than photocopy machines, cassette and video recorders, it is not necessary to wring every penny of value
from a piece of intellectual property. Publishers have always been very ingenious in figuring out ways to
make money. They do not need the help of the laws.
454) The film and television industries panicked at the advent of video recorders and even sued by one
of the makers,[L_] on the ground that all the illicit private copying would put them out of business.
They lost the case and were forced to find their own solution. The video industry soon learned that if it
was going to charge eighty to one hundred dollars per video, no one would buy them, and many people
would pirate copies with their VCRs. When the industry lowered the price to twenty dollars, industry
members found that they could sell millions and make much more money. At fifteen or twenty dollars
per video, people are willing to pay for packaging, better quality, and convenience. The incentive to
pirate decreases.
(55) The publishing industry's argument is that digitization is different. The quality is just as good and
there is no inconvenience. However, there are several factors this argument ignores. First, not only is it
cheaper for the user to copy and distribute material, it is also cheaper for the publisher. Publishing and
distribution costs go down, but the potential market is much bigger - worldwide, so as much or more
money can be made overall. Second, the technology does provide ways to harness value. Access to
databases can be contingent on paying a fee. There are encryption methods that can only be opened if
one possesses a "key." And other methods will no doubt be developed.[ 12]. The industry argues that all
of these methods can be circumvented, and once something is "out," it can be made available to the rest
of the world for free.[L 13] This is true, but they may underestimate the user. People are willing to pay
for the "genuine article," as long as it does not cost too much. No one wants a "new and improved"
version of Hamlet. They want the real thing. People do not want to be duped. They are often willing to
pay a lot of money for a guarantee of authenticity if there is any significant danger it is not. People
already pay for brand names because they believe it is a guarantee of quality.
{561 The publishing industry must figure out new ways to market things. Some groups have already
begun to do so. It may no longer be practical to think in terms of selling individual items; value on the
Internet may be in the form of services.[ 14] Some software companies have chosen to give software
away since they cannot prevent pirating. Instead, these companies charge for support services, upgrades, etc.L 1 Other groups have chosen to collect revenue through advertising. Like network
television, the content is free, you just have to take the advertising along with it. Another way to collect
money is to charge by time rather than item. Many service providers such as CompuServe, America
Online, Prodigy etc. operate in this manner, just like a long distance telephone company. Westlaw and
Lexis use this method. A solution for software companies may be a method called metering, in which
you "rent" the software each time you use it, so that when you access it, a meter keeps track of the time
and you pay at the end of the month. Another method is that of subscription, in which you get unlimited
access to anything to which you pay the subscription price. The options are only limited by the so-called
laws of the market and the publishing industry's imagination, and thinking of ways to make money is the
industry's business.
VII. Conclusion
{57) The White Paper claims that only a few minor changes need to be made to the Copyright Act to
bring it in line with the new technology. What it fails to acknowledge is that digitization has already

amended the Copyright Act without any help from Congress. The balance of rights between authors,
users, and the publishing industry has already been radically altered. Authors' moral rights are in grave
jeopardy, as are user rights if we do not reinterpret the reproduction right. The publishing industry is not
in as much trouble as it claims, it just has more money to cry louder. Already people are figuring out
ways to make money on the Internet. Before Congress rushes to save our intellectual property, it should
wait to see what technology, the marketplace, and peoples imaginations can come up with. All that is
really needed at this point is a few laws to protect the dignity and moral rights of authors from the worst
of what digitization allows people to do.
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